[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"doc-seo-160042-105":3,"detail-sidebar-cat-0-en-105":81,"doc-detail-160042-en":131},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"ok",{"site_id":7,"language":8,"slug":9,"title":10,"keywords":11,"description":12,"schema_data":13,"social_meta":74,"head_meta":76,"extra_data":78,"updated_unix":80},105,"en","formal-verification-of-a-v2x-security-credential-management-system","Formal verification of a V2X Security Credential Management System","","Formal verification is applied to a V2X Security Credential Management System to address cybersecurity threats that emerge as vehicles gain connectivity and automation. V2X communication enables cooperative services such as traffic incident reporting, collision warning, and cooperative automated driving, but also increases exposure to privacy and security attacks. The thesis models the SCMS components and protocol steps, encodes the system in a formal verification framework, and proves security properties related to authentication, secrecy, and privacy guarantees.",{"@graph":14,"@context":73},[15,34,56],{"@type":16,"itemListElement":17},"BreadcrumbList",[18,23,27,31],{"item":19,"name":20,"@type":21,"position":22},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",1,{"item":24,"name":25,"@type":21,"position":26},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":28,"name":29,"@type":21,"position":30},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/","Research & Report",3,{"item":32,"name":10,"@type":21,"position":33},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/formal-verification-of-a-v2x-security-credential-management-system/160042/",4,{"url":32,"name":10,"@type":35,"image":36,"author":41,"headline":10,"publisher":44,"fileFormat":47,"inLanguage":8,"description":12,"dateModified":48,"datePublished":49,"encodingFormat":47,"isAccessibleForFree":50,"interactionStatistic":51},"DigitalDocument",{"url":37,"@type":38,"width":39,"height":40},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/formal-verification-of-a-v2x-security-credential-management-system/160042.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":42,"@type":43},"Seraphina","Person",{"url":19,"name":45,"@type":46},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-10-27","2026-08-30",true,{"@type":52,"interactionType":53,"userInteractionCount":55},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":54},"ViewAction",12,{"@type":57,"mainEntity":58},"FAQPage",[59,65,69],{"name":60,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":62},"What problem does the thesis address in V2X systems?","Question",{"text":63,"@type":64},"It targets the privacy-related security risks that grow when vehicles use V2X connectivity for cooperative services.","Answer",{"name":66,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":67},"How is the V2X Security Credential Management System (SCMS) handled in the work?",{"text":68,"@type":64},"The thesis defines SCMS design and structure, models certificate provisioning, key expansion, and protocol steps such as bootstrapping, revocation, and misbehavior reporting.",{"name":70,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":71},"Which kinds of security properties are verified?",{"text":72,"@type":64},"Verification focuses on sanity checks for executability and authentication, plus secrecy and privacy properties including anonymity and unlinkability.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":32,"og:type":75,"og:title":10,"og:site_name":45,"og:description":12},"article",{"robots":77,"canonical":32},"index,follow",{"doc_id":79,"site_id":7},160042,1788049383,{"code":4,"msg":82,"data":83},"success",[84,88,92,96,101,106,111,115,120,123,127],{"id":22,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":85,"show_sort_weight":86,"slug":87},"Story & Novel",90,"story-novel",{"id":26,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":89,"show_sort_weight":90,"slug":91},"Literature",80,"literature",{"id":33,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":93,"show_sort_weight":94,"slug":95},"Exam",70,"exam",{"id":97,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":98,"show_sort_weight":99,"slug":100},5,"Comic",60,"comic",{"id":102,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":103,"show_sort_weight":104,"slug":105},6,"Technology",50,"technology",{"id":107,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":108,"show_sort_weight":109,"slug":110},7,"Healthcare",40,"healthcare",{"id":112,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":29,"show_sort_weight":113,"slug":114},8,30,"research-report",{"id":116,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":117,"show_sort_weight":118,"slug":119},9,"Religion & Spirituality",20,"religion-spirituality",{"id":118,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":121,"show_sort_weight":118,"slug":122},"World Cup","world-cup",{"id":124,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":125,"show_sort_weight":124,"slug":126},10,"Lifestyle","lifestyle",{"id":128,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":129,"show_sort_weight":97,"slug":130},19,"General","general",{"code":4,"msg":82,"data":132},{"doc_id":79,"user_id":133,"nickname":42,"user_avatar":134,"doc_module":4,"category_id":112,"category_name":29,"doc_title":10,"doc_description":12,"doc_content":135,"file_id":136,"file_url":137,"file_type":138,"file_size":139,"view_count":55,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":22,"is_downloadable":22,"audit_status":22,"page_count":90,"language":140,"language_code":8,"site_id":7,"html_lang":8,"table_of_contents":141,"faqs":142,"seo_title":143,"seo_description":12,"update_tm":80,"read_time":144,"preview_page_count":4},962075114101,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/avatar/e000253a75eb197efd?x-image-process=image/resize,m_fixed,w_180,h_180&k=1780044092746381165","POLITECNICO DI TORINO  \nMaster’s Degree in Computer Engineering  \nMaster’s Degree Thesis  \nFormal verification of a V2X Security Credential Management System  \nSupervisors Candidate  \nProf. Riccardo Sisto Francesco Rametta  \nProf. Fulvio Valenza Dott. Simone Bussa  \nAcademic Year 2022-2023  \nAi miei genitori † Ai miei nonni  \nAcknowledgements  \nGrazie ai miei relatori, i Prof. Riccardo Sisto e Fulvio Valenza, che mi hanno permesso diapprofondire il mondo della verifica formale e quello delle V2X con questo lavoro di tesi.  \nUn grazie speciale va al Dottorando Simone Bussa che è stato sempre presente e disponibile supportandomi durante questo percorso e gli auguro il meglio per la sua carriera accademica.  \nGrazie  \nContents  \nList of Figures 7  \n1 Introduction 9  \n1. 1 Structure of the document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10  \n2 General Overview 11  \n2.1 V2X-Vehicle to everything . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11  \n2.2 Formal Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13  \n2.2. 1 Symbolic Modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15  \n2.3 Tamarin-Prover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16  \n2.4 Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17  \n2.4.1 Input File-Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17  \n3 Security Credential Management System 23  \n3.1 SCMS Design .................................. 24  \n3.2 SCMS Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25  \n3.3 Certificate Provisioning Model and Certificate Types ............ 29  \n3.3.1 Certificate Types ............................ 30  \n3.4 Butterfly Key Expansion ............................ 31  \n3.5 SCMS-Protocol Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33  \n3.5.1 Bootstrapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33  \n3.5.2 Certificate Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34  \n3.5.3 Misbehavior reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37  \n3.5.4 Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38  \n4 Objective of the thesis 41  \n5 SCMS-Design Model in Tamarin 43  \n5.1 Preliminary steps and Assumptions ...................... 43  \n5.2 Tamarin theory setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44  \n5.2. 1 Support rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47  \n5.3 Bootstrapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49  \n5.4 Certificate Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50  \n5.5 Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56  \n6 Results 63  \n6.1 Sanity checks .................................. 63  \n6.1.1 Executability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63  \n6.1.2 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65  \n6.1.3 Bootstrapping success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67  \n6.1.4 Partial deconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68  \n6.2 Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69  \n6.3 Privacy Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70  \n6.3. 1 Anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70  \n6.3.2 Unlinkability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72  \n7 Conclusion 77  \nBibliography 79  \nList of Figures  \n2. 1 Possible scheme PKI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12  \n2.2 Formal verification procedure steps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14  \n3. 1 SCMS architecture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26  \n3.2 SCMS Legend.................................. 27  \n3.3 Butterfly key expansion steps...............","cbCaiusZ4Fw3v4zt","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaiusZ4Fw3v4zt","pdf",3253662,"English","# Introduction\n## General Overview\n## Security Credential Management System\n## Objective of the thesis\n## SCMS-Design Model in Tamarin\n## Results\n## Conclusion","[{\"question\":\"What problem does the thesis address in V2X systems?\",\"answer\":\"It targets the privacy-related security risks that grow when vehicles use V2X connectivity for cooperative services.\"},{\"question\":\"How is the V2X Security Credential Management System (SCMS) handled in the work?\",\"answer\":\"The thesis defines SCMS design and structure, models certificate provisioning, key expansion, and protocol steps such as bootstrapping, revocation, and misbehavior reporting.\"},{\"question\":\"Which kinds of security properties are verified?\",\"answer\":\"Verification focuses on sanity checks for executability and authentication, plus secrecy and privacy properties including anonymity and unlinkability.\"}]","Formal verification of a V2X Security Credential Management System | PDF",202]