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The paper endogenizes loyalty and competence in a principal-agent game in both static and dynamic settings, highlighting how conditional punishment tied to the dictator’s survival shapes incentives and the succession problem.",{"@graph":14,"@context":73},[15,34,56],{"@type":16,"itemListElement":17},"BreadcrumbList",[18,23,27,31],{"item":19,"name":20,"@type":21,"position":22},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",1,{"item":24,"name":25,"@type":21,"position":26},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":28,"name":29,"@type":21,"position":30},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/","Research & Report",3,{"item":32,"name":10,"@type":21,"position":33},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/dictators-and-their-viziers-endogenizing-the-loyaltycompetence-trade-off/608297/",4,{"url":32,"name":10,"@type":35,"image":36,"author":41,"headline":10,"publisher":44,"fileFormat":47,"inLanguage":8,"description":12,"dateModified":48,"datePublished":49,"encodingFormat":47,"isAccessibleForFree":50,"interactionStatistic":51},"DigitalDocument",{"url":37,"@type":38,"width":39,"height":40},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/dictators-and-their-viziers-endogenizing-the-loyaltycompetence-trade-off/608297.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":42,"@type":43},"Margaret","Person",{"url":19,"name":45,"@type":46},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-10-30","2026-10-17",true,{"@type":52,"interactionType":53,"userInteractionCount":55},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":54},"ViewAction",5,{"@type":57,"mainEntity":58},"FAQPage",[59,65,69],{"name":60,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":62},"Why do dictators often appoint incompetent but loyal cronies or relatives?","Question",{"text":63,"@type":64},"The paper argues that fear of disloyalty leads rulers—especially insecure ones—to trade away competence to reduce the risk that close associates will plot. In this setting, loyalty is endogenized because competence can increase treason incentives.","Answer",{"name":66,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":67},"What is the core theoretical framework used in the paper?",{"text":68,"@type":64},"It models the loyalty-versus-competence trade-off as a principal-agent game between a dictator and his viziers. The dictator chooses among lieutenants with varying competence under uncertainty about a potential challenger’s strength.",{"name":70,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":71},"How does competence affect treason risk in the dynamic setting?",{"text":72,"@type":64},"Greater competence allows the vizier to better understand the odds of winning in a conspiracy, making participation in a plot more attractive even if the offered reward is lower. The dynamic model further emphasizes succession problems faced by insecure dictators.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":32,"og:type":75,"og:title":10,"og:site_name":45,"og:description":12},"article",{"robots":77,"canonical":32},"index,follow",{"doc_id":79,"site_id":7},608297,1792834063,{"code":4,"msg":82,"data":83},"success",[84,88,92,96,100,105,110,114,119,122,126],{"id":22,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":85,"show_sort_weight":86,"slug":87},"Story & Novel",90,"story-novel",{"id":26,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":89,"show_sort_weight":90,"slug":91},"Literature",80,"literature",{"id":33,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":93,"show_sort_weight":94,"slug":95},"Exam",70,"exam",{"id":55,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":97,"show_sort_weight":98,"slug":99},"Comic",60,"comic",{"id":101,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":102,"show_sort_weight":103,"slug":104},6,"Technology",50,"technology",{"id":106,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":107,"show_sort_weight":108,"slug":109},7,"Healthcare",40,"healthcare",{"id":111,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":29,"show_sort_weight":112,"slug":113},8,30,"research-report",{"id":115,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":116,"show_sort_weight":117,"slug":118},9,"Religion & Spirituality",20,"religion-spirituality",{"id":117,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":120,"show_sort_weight":117,"slug":121},"World Cup","world-cup",{"id":123,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":124,"show_sort_weight":123,"slug":125},10,"Lifestyle","lifestyle",{"id":127,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":128,"show_sort_weight":55,"slug":129},19,"General","general",{"code":4,"msg":82,"data":131},{"doc_id":79,"user_id":132,"nickname":42,"user_avatar":133,"doc_module":4,"category_id":111,"category_name":29,"doc_title":10,"doc_description":12,"doc_content":134,"file_id":135,"file_url":136,"file_type":137,"file_size":138,"view_count":55,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":22,"is_downloadable":22,"audit_status":22,"page_count":139,"language":140,"language_code":8,"site_id":7,"html_lang":8,"table_of_contents":141,"faqs":142,"seo_title":143,"seo_description":12,"update_tm":144,"read_time":145},137451207643,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/davatar_3d24733baf745e90a7e4bdd5f77d97b2","DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY–COMPETENCE TRADE-OFF  \nGeorgy Egorov  \nNorthwestern University  \nKonstantin Sonin  \nNew Economic School, Moscow Northwestern University  \nAbstract  \nThe possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most autocrats throughout history. More competent viziers are better able to discriminate among potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the ruler. To avoid this, rulers, especially those who are weak and vulnerable, sacrifice the competence oftheir agents, hiring mediocre but loyal subordinates. Furthermore, any use of incentive schemes by a personalistic dictator is limited by the fact that all punishments are conditional on the dictator’s own survival. We endogenize loyalty and competence in a principal-agent game between a dictator and his viziers in both static and dynamic settings. The dynamic model allows us to focus on the succession problem that insecure dictators face.(JEL: D72, H00, C72, C82)  \nStanley: Most mighty sovereign, You have no cause to hold my friendship doubtful.  \nI never was nor never will be false.  \nKing Richard: Go then andmustermen. But leave behind Your son, George Stanley. Look your heart be firm, Or else his head’s assurance is but frail.”  \n——William Shakespeare, Richard III, Act 4, Scene 4  \nThe best way to understand the way Stalin worked is to ... reread Shakespeare’s Richard III.  \n——S. E. Finer, The History of Government from the Earliest Times  \n1. Introduction  \nAuthoritarianism is one of the oldest forms of government (see Olson 1993; Tullock 1987), yet it has attracted little attention from political economists until very recently.1  \nThe editor in charge of this paper was Patrick Bolton.  \nAcknowledgments: We thank Avinash Dixit, David Epstein, Clifford Geertz, Scott Gehlbach, Paul Gregory, Sergei Guriev, Yoshiko Herrera, Andrew Kydd, John Londregan, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson, John Nye, Robert Powell, Philip Reny, Gerard Roland, Thomas Romer, Andrei Shleifer, Barry Weingast, and seminar participants at Harvard/MIT, Penn State, Chicago, Princeton, Berkeley, IAS, NYU/Columbia, MPSA 2005 conference, and the 2005 World Congress of Econometric Society for many valuable comments. The second author’s membership at the Institute for Advanced Study in 2004–2005 was supported by the Deutsche Bank.  \nE-mail addresses: [g-egorov@kellogg.northwestern.edu](g-egorov@kellogg.northwestern.edu) (Egorov); [ksonin@gmail.com](ksonin@gmail.com) (Sonin)  \n1. For an overview of the state of the art in the formal work on dictatorship, see Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), and Wintrobe (2004) . Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Gallego and Pitchik (2004), and Overland, Simmons,  \nJournal of the European Economic Association 􀀂c 2011 by the European Economic Association  \nOctober 2011  \n9(5):903–930  \nDOI: 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01033.x  \n904 Journal of the European Economic Association  \nWhile the number of democratic countries increased significantly during the last decades of the 20th century, dictatorships still account for almost one-half of the world’s current population. There is also a non-negligible number of relatively new dictatorships, especially in countries ofthe former Soviet Union, such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Belarus. In this paper, we focus on the internal structure of the most personalized dictatorships, especially those that have exhibited strikingly poor governance (for the most recent examples, see, for example, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Haber 2005; Linz and Stepan 1978) .  \nWhy do dictators, who presumably fear that poor economic performance or the inability to carry out political repressions might cost them their position in power, appoint incompetent cronies or relatives to crucial economic and military positions in government? While incompetent ministers are arguably not unusual in democratic cou","cbCaigUpsrlGwkHN","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaigUpsrlGwkHN","pdf",192631,28,"English","# Introduction\n## Historical and political context\n## Loyalty-versus-competence trade-off\n## Model overview and research focus","[{\"question\":\"Why do dictators often appoint incompetent but loyal cronies or relatives?\",\"answer\":\"The paper argues that fear of disloyalty leads rulers—especially insecure ones—to trade away competence to reduce the risk that close associates will plot. In this setting, loyalty is endogenized because competence can increase treason incentives.\"},{\"question\":\"What is the core theoretical framework used in the paper?\",\"answer\":\"It models the loyalty-versus-competence trade-off as a principal-agent game between a dictator and his viziers. The dictator chooses among lieutenants with varying competence under uncertainty about a potential challenger’s strength.\"},{\"question\":\"How does competence affect treason risk in the dynamic setting?\",\"answer\":\"Greater competence allows the vizier to better understand the odds of winning in a conspiracy, making participation in a plot more attractive even if the offered reward is lower. The dynamic model further emphasizes succession problems faced by insecure dictators.\"}]","DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY–COMPETENCE TRADE-OFF | PDF",1792229142,71]