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Larger teams correlate with higher likelihood of high-risk research and stronger noncompliance reporting, while sector differences shape oversight capacity and review scope.",{"@graph":14,"@context":73},[15,34,56],{"@type":16,"itemListElement":17},"BreadcrumbList",[18,23,27,31],{"item":19,"name":20,"@type":21,"position":22},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",1,{"item":24,"name":25,"@type":21,"position":26},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":28,"name":29,"@type":21,"position":30},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/","Research & Report",3,{"item":32,"name":10,"@type":21,"position":33},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/bridging-biosafety-and-biosecurity-gaps-durc-and-eppp-policy-insights-from-us-institutions/294254/",4,{"url":32,"name":10,"@type":35,"image":36,"author":41,"headline":10,"publisher":44,"fileFormat":47,"inLanguage":8,"description":12,"dateModified":48,"datePublished":49,"encodingFormat":47,"isAccessibleForFree":50,"interactionStatistic":51},"DigitalDocument",{"url":37,"@type":38,"width":39,"height":40},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/bridging-biosafety-and-biosecurity-gaps-durc-and-eppp-policy-insights-from-us-institutions/294254.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":42,"@type":43},"\tWilliam","Person",{"url":19,"name":45,"@type":46},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-10-18","2026-09-17",true,{"@type":52,"interactionType":53,"userInteractionCount":55},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":54},"ViewAction",9,{"@type":57,"mainEntity":58},"FAQPage",[59,65,69],{"name":60,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":62},"What is the main purpose of the study?","Question",{"text":63,"@type":64},"To provide empirical insights into knowledge and practices related to DURC and ePPPs, supporting improved public health interventions and oversight for these research areas.","Answer",{"name":66,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":67},"How was the study conducted?",{"text":68,"@type":64},"The study used a survey of 541 biosafety and biosecurity professionals conducted between March 8 and April 10, 2024, with results analyzed using SAS at a 0.05 significance level.",{"name":70,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":71},"What key findings relate team size to research activity?",{"text":72,"@type":64},"Institutions with larger biosafety/biosecurity teams reported greater research activity and more effective noncompliance reporting mechanisms, such as anonymous hotlines and reporting forms.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":32,"og:type":75,"og:title":10,"og:site_name":45,"og:description":12},"article",{"robots":77,"canonical":32},"index,follow",{"doc_id":79,"site_id":7},294254,1789680715,{"code":4,"msg":82,"data":83},"success",[84,88,92,96,101,106,111,115,119,122,126],{"id":22,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":85,"show_sort_weight":86,"slug":87},"Story & Novel",90,"story-novel",{"id":26,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":89,"show_sort_weight":90,"slug":91},"Literature",80,"literature",{"id":33,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":93,"show_sort_weight":94,"slug":95},"Exam",70,"exam",{"id":97,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":98,"show_sort_weight":99,"slug":100},5,"Comic",60,"comic",{"id":102,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":103,"show_sort_weight":104,"slug":105},6,"Technology",50,"technology",{"id":107,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":108,"show_sort_weight":109,"slug":110},7,"Healthcare",40,"healthcare",{"id":112,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":29,"show_sort_weight":113,"slug":114},8,30,"research-report",{"id":55,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":116,"show_sort_weight":117,"slug":118},"Religion & Spirituality",20,"religion-spirituality",{"id":117,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":120,"show_sort_weight":117,"slug":121},"World Cup","world-cup",{"id":123,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":124,"show_sort_weight":123,"slug":125},10,"Lifestyle","lifestyle",{"id":127,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":128,"show_sort_weight":97,"slug":129},19,"General","general",{"code":4,"msg":82,"data":131},{"doc_id":79,"user_id":132,"nickname":42,"user_avatar":133,"doc_module":4,"category_id":112,"category_name":29,"doc_title":10,"doc_description":12,"doc_content":134,"file_id":135,"file_url":136,"file_type":137,"file_size":138,"view_count":55,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":22,"is_downloadable":22,"audit_status":22,"page_count":139,"language":140,"language_code":8,"site_id":7,"html_lang":8,"table_of_contents":141,"faqs":142,"seo_title":143,"seo_description":12,"update_tm":80,"read_time":144,"preview_page_count":4},5909887254083,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/davatar_276721f389ce27ea32af1340a28f341c","TYPE Original Research PUBLISHED 25 September 2024 DOI 10.3389/fbioe.2024.1476527  \nOPEN ACCESS  \nEDITED BY  \nSegaran P. Pillai,  \nUnited States Department of Health and Human Services, United States  \nREVIEWED BY  \nGerald Epstein,  \nNational Defense University, United States Ryan Ritterson,  \nDeloitte (United States), United States  \n*CORRESPONDENCE  \nDavid R. Gillum,  [dgillum@unr.edu](dgillum@unr.edu)  \nRECEIVED 06 August 2024  \nACCEPTED 09 September 2024  \nPUBLISHED 25 September 2024  \nCITATION  \nGillum DR, Tran A, Fletcher J and Vogel KM (2024) Bridging biosafety and biosecurity gaps:  \nDURC and ePPP policy insights from  \nU. S. institutions.  \nFront. Bioeng. Biotechnol. 12:1476527 .  \ndoi: 10.3389/fbioe.2024.1476527  \nCOPYRIGHT  \n© 2024 Gillum, Tran, Fletcher and Vogel. This isan open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.  \nBridging biosafety and biosecurity gaps: DURC and ePPP policy insights from U.S. institutions  \nDavid R. Gillum 1,2*, An Tran 3, Jennifer Fletcher 4 and Kathleen M. Vogel 1  \n1School for the Future of Innovation and Society, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, United States, 2Research and Innovation, University of Nevada, Reno, NV, United States, 3Environmental Science and Health, University of Nevada, Reno, NV, United States, 4Accountability, Assessment and Research, Chandler Unified School District, Chandler, AZ, United States  \nOverview: This study provides empirical data on the knowledge and practices of biosafety and biosecurity professionals and researchers involved in research on enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens (ePPPs) and Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) within various U. S. sectors. The goal is to improve public health interventions and oversight for DURC and ePPP, contributing valuable insights for policy development. A notable finding was the association between larger biosafety/biosecurity teams and a higher likelihood of conducting high-risk biological research.  \nMethods: A survey of 541 biosafety and biosecurity professionals was conducted between March 8 and 10 April 2024, with results analyzed using SAS at asignificance level of 0 .05. The study received approval from the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) at Arizona State University and the University of Nevada, Reno.  \nResults: Government organizations were more likely to conduct DURC compared to other sectors (e. g., Academic, Commercial, Consulting) . Public institutions reviewed more experiments outside the scope of the U. S. DURC Policy than private for-profit institutions. Institutions with larger biosafety/ biosecurity teams reported greater research activity and more effective noncompliance reporting mechanisms (e. g., anonymous hotlines, reporting forms) . Additionally, financial support and the challenges of policy implementation varied significantly across sectors.  \nDiscussion: The findings emphasize the need for appropriate staffing and resource allocation for high-risk biosafety and biosecurity research. A differentiated regulatory approach and equitable distribution of resources are essential for effective oversight. Moreover, robust non-compliance reporting systems are critical to mitigating the risks associated with DURC and ePPP research.  \nKEYWORDS  \ndual use research of concern (DURC), enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (ePPP), biosafety, biosecurity, non-compliance reporting, risk management, biosafety survey, organizational safety  \nFrontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology 01 [frontiersin.org](frontiersin.org)  \n1 Introduction  \nResearch that involves dual use research of concern (DURC) and enhanced potential pand","cbCaieT3g0r9MIfo","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaieT3g0r9MIfo","pdf",1783373,23,"English","# Overview\n## Methods\n## Results\n## Discussion\n# Introduction","[{\"question\":\"What is the main purpose of the study?\",\"answer\":\"To provide empirical insights into knowledge and practices related to DURC and ePPPs, supporting improved public health interventions and oversight for these research areas.\"},{\"question\":\"How was the study conducted?\",\"answer\":\"The study used a survey of 541 biosafety and biosecurity professionals conducted between March 8 and April 10, 2024, with results analyzed using SAS at a 0.05 significance level.\"},{\"question\":\"What key findings relate team size to research activity?\",\"answer\":\"Institutions with larger biosafety/biosecurity teams reported greater research activity and more effective noncompliance reporting mechanisms, such as anonymous hotlines and reporting forms.\"}]","Bridging biosafety and biosecurity gaps: DURC and ePPP policy insights from U.S. institutions | PDF",58]