[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"doc-detail-31238":3,"doc-seo-31238":26},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",{"doc_id":7,"user_id":8,"nickname":9,"user_avatar":10,"doc_module":4,"category_id":11,"category_name":12,"doc_title":13,"doc_description":14,"file_id":15,"file_url":16,"file_type":17,"file_size":18,"view_count":19,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":19,"is_downloadable":19,"audit_status":19,"page_count":20,"language":21,"table_of_contents":22,"faqs":23,"seo_title":13,"seo_description":14,"update_tm":24,"read_time":25},31238,4398048950312,"Violet","https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/avatar/400002538284de19e3c?_k=1778320343897328908",8,"Research & Report","Board Quality and Earnings Management Evidence from India","This article investigates whether board quality shapes firms’ earnings management in a large emerging-market setting, using panel data from 783 Indian private manufacturing companies across a seven-year period (April 2009–March 2016). Findings show that board quality curbs earnings manipulation beyond the effect of board independence. Diligent, active boards reduce earnings management; CEO duality affects the quality of reported earnings; and promoter influence increases earnings management. Institutional investors show no independent impact, while domestic institutional ownership reduces earnings management when promoters influence exists.","cbCainK5q9PqPySb","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCainK5q9PqPySb","pdf",673458,1,23,"English","# Introduction\n## Earnings management motives and information effects\n## Corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms\n# Abstract Findings and implications","[{\"question\":\"What dataset and time span does the study use to analyze earnings management?\",\"answer\":\"The study uses panel data of 783 Indian private manufacturing firms over seven years, from April 2009 to March 2016.\"},{\"question\":\"How does board quality affect earnings management according to the study?\",\"answer\":\"Board quality helps curb earnings manipulation, and the effect is not limited to board independence.\"},{\"question\":\"What roles do CEO duality and promoter influence play in earnings management outcomes?\",\"answer\":\"CEO duality affects the quality of reported earnings, while promoters’ influence on boards increases earnings management.\"}]",1779224485,58,{"code":4,"msg":27,"data":28},"ok",{"site_id":29,"language":30,"slug":31,"title":13,"keywords":32,"description":14,"schema_data":33,"social_meta":85,"head_meta":87,"extra_data":89,"updated_unix":24},105,"en","board-quality-and-earnings-management-evidence-from-india","",{"@graph":34,"@context":84},[35,52,67],{"@type":36,"itemListElement":37},"BreadcrumbList",[38,42,46,49],{"item":39,"name":40,"@type":41,"position":19},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":43,"name":44,"@type":41,"position":45},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":47,"name":12,"@type":41,"position":48},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/",3,{"item":50,"name":13,"@type":41,"position":51},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/board-quality-and-earnings-management-evidence-from-india/31238/",4,{"url":50,"name":13,"@type":53,"author":54,"headline":13,"publisher":56,"fileFormat":59,"description":14,"dateModified":60,"datePublished":61,"encodingFormat":59,"isAccessibleForFree":62,"interactionStatistic":63},"DigitalDocument",{"name":9,"@type":55},"Person",{"url":39,"name":57,"@type":58},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-05-20","2026-05-19",true,{"@type":64,"interactionType":65,"userInteractionCount":19},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":66},"ViewAction",{"@type":68,"mainEntity":69},"FAQPage",[70,76,80],{"name":71,"@type":72,"acceptedAnswer":73},"What dataset and time span does the study use to analyze earnings management?","Question",{"text":74,"@type":75},"The study uses panel data of 783 Indian private manufacturing firms over seven years, from April 2009 to March 2016.","Answer",{"name":77,"@type":72,"acceptedAnswer":78},"How does board quality affect earnings management according to the study?",{"text":79,"@type":75},"Board quality helps curb earnings manipulation, and the effect is not limited to board independence.",{"name":81,"@type":72,"acceptedAnswer":82},"What roles do CEO duality and promoter influence play in earnings management outcomes?",{"text":83,"@type":75},"CEO duality affects the quality of reported earnings, while promoters’ influence on boards increases earnings management.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":50,"og:type":86,"og:title":13,"og:site_name":57,"og:description":14},"article",{"robots":88,"canonical":50},"index,follow",{"doc_id":7,"site_id":29}]