[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"detail-sidebar-cat-0-en-105":3,"doc-seo-295313-105":59,"doc-detail-295313-en":130},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",[7,13,18,23,28,33,38,43,48,51,55],{"id":8,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":10,"show_sort_weight":11,"slug":12},1,"Document","Story & Novel",90,"story-novel",{"id":14,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":15,"show_sort_weight":16,"slug":17},2,"Literature",80,"literature",{"id":19,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":20,"show_sort_weight":21,"slug":22},4,"Exam",70,"exam",{"id":24,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":25,"show_sort_weight":26,"slug":27},5,"Comic",60,"comic",{"id":29,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":30,"show_sort_weight":31,"slug":32},6,"Technology",50,"technology",{"id":34,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":35,"show_sort_weight":36,"slug":37},7,"Healthcare",40,"healthcare",{"id":39,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":40,"show_sort_weight":41,"slug":42},8,"Research & Report",30,"research-report",{"id":44,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":45,"show_sort_weight":46,"slug":47},9,"Religion & Spirituality",20,"religion-spirituality",{"id":46,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":49,"show_sort_weight":46,"slug":50},"World Cup","world-cup",{"id":52,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":53,"show_sort_weight":52,"slug":54},10,"Lifestyle","lifestyle",{"id":56,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":57,"show_sort_weight":24,"slug":58},19,"General","general",{"code":4,"msg":60,"data":61},"ok",{"site_id":62,"language":63,"slug":64,"title":65,"keywords":66,"description":67,"schema_data":68,"social_meta":123,"head_meta":125,"extra_data":127,"updated_unix":129},105,"en","asymmetric-information-in-auctions-are-resellers-better-appraisers","Asymmetric Information in Auctions: Are Resellers Better Appraisers?","","Online car auctions are analyzed to determine whether resellers appraise vehicle values more effectively than consumers. Using a unique dataset and the asymmetric ascending auction framework of Hong and Shum (2003), the study attributes behavioral differences to heterogeneity in the accuracy of bidders’ private signals and in the dispersion of private value components. Evidence indicates reseller signal dispersion is about half of consumers’ and that converting bidders into resellers increases auction revenues. The mechanism is linked to uncertainty about cars’ resale value.",{"@graph":69,"@context":122},[70,84,105],{"@type":71,"itemListElement":72},"BreadcrumbList",[73,77,79,82],{"item":74,"name":75,"@type":76,"position":8},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":78,"name":9,"@type":76,"position":14},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/",{"item":80,"name":40,"@type":76,"position":81},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/",3,{"item":83,"name":65,"@type":76,"position":19},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/asymmetric-information-in-auctions-are-resellers-better-appraisers/295313/",{"url":83,"name":65,"@type":85,"image":86,"author":91,"headline":65,"publisher":94,"fileFormat":97,"inLanguage":63,"description":67,"dateModified":98,"datePublished":99,"encodingFormat":97,"isAccessibleForFree":100,"interactionStatistic":101},"DigitalDocument",{"url":87,"@type":88,"width":89,"height":90},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/asymmetric-information-in-auctions-are-resellers-better-appraisers/295313.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":92,"@type":93},"Graffin","Person",{"url":74,"name":95,"@type":96},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-10-27","2026-09-18",true,{"@type":102,"interactionType":103,"userInteractionCount":52},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":104},"ViewAction",{"@type":106,"mainEntity":107},"FAQPage",[108,114,118],{"name":109,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":111},"What is the main question of the paper?","Question",{"text":112,"@type":113},"The paper asks whether resellers are better appraisers than consumers in online car auctions.","Answer",{"name":115,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":116},"How does the study explain differences between resellers and consumers?",{"text":117,"@type":113},"It explains differences via heterogeneity in how accurate bidders’ private signals are and via heterogeneity in how dispersed private value components are.",{"name":119,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":120},"What does the model predict about bid shading and the number of bidders?",{"text":121,"@type":113},"When the common value component matters more, bidders shade bids to address the winner’s curse, leading average bids to decline as bidder numbers rise. Improving signal precision reduces overpaying and weakens shading incentives.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":83,"og:type":124,"og:title":65,"og:site_name":95,"og:description":67},"article",{"robots":126,"canonical":83},"index,follow",{"doc_id":128,"site_id":62},295313,1790101240,{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":131},{"doc_id":128,"user_id":132,"nickname":92,"user_avatar":133,"doc_module":4,"category_id":39,"category_name":40,"doc_title":65,"doc_description":67,"doc_content":134,"file_id":135,"file_url":136,"file_type":137,"file_size":138,"view_count":52,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":8,"is_downloadable":8,"audit_status":8,"page_count":139,"language":140,"language_code":63,"site_id":62,"html_lang":63,"table_of_contents":141,"faqs":142,"seo_title":143,"seo_description":67,"update_tm":144,"read_time":145,"preview_page_count":4},3573418547284,"https://eur-avatar.wpscdn.com/davatar_994ba38a5ba835b3df7d355c54d3ed8d","Asymmetric Information in Auctions:  \nAre Resellers Better Appraisers? 􀀃  \nNikita Koptyugy  \nJanuary 2015  \nJob Market Paper  \nAbstract  \nThis paper shows that in online car auctions, resellers are better at appraising the value of the cars they are bidding on than are consumers. Using a unique data set of online car auctions, I show that di✛erences in bidding behavior between resellers and consumers can be explained by heterogeneity in the accuracy of bidders✬ private signals and heterogeneity in the dispersion of private value components. I use the asymmetric ascending auction model of Hong and Shum (2003) to quantify the di✛erences between resellers and consumers, ✜nding that the dispersion of reseller value signals is roughly half that of consumers and show that turning everyone into a reseller has a signi✜cant positive e✛ect on auction revenues. Finally, I argue that the asymmetry in signal precision stems not from asymmetric information regarding the technical characteristics of a car but rather from uncertainty about the car✬s resale value.  \nJEL Codes: L62, C51, D44, D82  \nKey words: Ascending (English) Auctions, Asymmetric Auctions, Experience, Learning, Winner✬s Curse, Bid Shading, Signal Precision, Resellers  \n􀀃 I would like to thank Tore Ellingsen, Richard Friberg, Cristian Huse, Robert H. Porter and Tomas Thörnqvist. I would also like to thank participants at the IIOC, EARIE and CEPR Applied Industrial Organization Summer School. The usual disclaimer applies.  \ny Stockholm School of Economics. Email address: [nikita.koptyug@hhs.se. Correspondence](nikita.koptyug@hhs.se. Correspondence) address: Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden.  \n1 Introduction  \nIn an in✢uential study, Akerlof (1970) showed that asymmetries in information between the buyers and sellers of cars may cause a breakdown in the used car market. Unscrupulous sellers will want to take advantage of knowing whether a car is a ✏lemon✑ -a bitter and unpleasant experience for the buyer-driving out good quality cars altogether or completely impeding transactions between buyers and seller.  \nIn auctions, in which a good is sold by a seller to many potential buyers, asymmetries may exist not only between the buyers and the sellers, but also across buyers; in oil drainage lease auctions conducted by the U.S. government, studies ✜nd ✜rms having drilled for oil in regions close to the location of the auctioned lease to behave in ways consistent with their having a clearer idea about the pro✜tability of a given location than outside ✜rms (Hendricks and Porter (1988), Hendricks, Porter and Wilson (1994)) . In a study of Mauritian slave auctions, Dionne, St-Amour and Vencatachellum (2009) ✜nd that not only is there evidence of asymmetric information between bidders but that this asymmetry leads to adverse selection in choosing which slaves to compete for.  \nIn car auctions, there are multiple ways asymmetries can arise; sellers may strategically choose how much information to release about the quality of the cars (Lewis, 2011) impacting the revenues generated as well as how well the market works (Tadelis and Zettelmeyer, 2011) . Furthermore, although there are car auctions in which only professionals, or resellers, participate (as ine.g. Tadelis and Zettelmeyer, 2011), there are auctions in which there are arguably both consumers and resellers. Although information is relevant only in cases in which bidder valuations are interdependent, with one bidder✬s information potentially in✢uencing that of another, even in independent private value settings the presence of resellers has been theoretically shown to induce interdependence between bidder valuations, potentially increasing the importance of di✛erences in information (Haile, 2001) .  \nIn this paper, I build on the existing literature by studying the di✛erences between consumersand resellers focusing not only on whether asymmetries in information exist, but also on quantifying them an","cbCaieT31j0HpSs6","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaieT31j0HpSs6","pdf",1764231,52,"English","# Introduction\n# Asymmetric ascending auction model and predictions\n## Signal precision and bidding behavior\n## Winner's curse, bid shading, and bidder count\n# Empirical evidence from online car auction data","[{\"question\":\"What is the main question of the paper?\",\"answer\":\"The paper asks whether resellers are better appraisers than consumers in online car auctions.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the study explain differences between resellers and consumers?\",\"answer\":\"It explains differences via heterogeneity in how accurate bidders’ private signals are and via heterogeneity in how dispersed private value components are.\"},{\"question\":\"What does the model predict about bid shading and the number of bidders?\",\"answer\":\"When the common value component matters more, bidders shade bids to address the winner’s curse, leading average bids to decline as bidder numbers rise. Improving signal precision reduces overpaying and weakens shading incentives.\"}]","Asymmetric Information in Auctions: Are Resellers Better Appraisers? | PDF",1789717683,131]