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Additional losses include Soviet domestic and regional pressures sparked by Afghan resistance.",{"@graph":14,"@context":72},[15,34,55],{"@type":16,"itemListElement":17},"BreadcrumbList",[18,23,27,31],{"item":19,"name":20,"@type":21,"position":22},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",1,{"item":24,"name":25,"@type":21,"position":26},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":28,"name":29,"@type":21,"position":30},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/","Research & Report",3,{"item":32,"name":10,"@type":21,"position":33},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/afghan-sand-inthe-soviet-cogs-may-2-1980/447751/",4,{"url":32,"name":10,"@type":35,"image":36,"author":41,"headline":10,"publisher":44,"fileFormat":47,"inLanguage":8,"description":12,"dateModified":48,"datePublished":49,"encodingFormat":47,"isAccessibleForFree":50,"interactionStatistic":51},"DigitalDocument",{"url":37,"@type":38,"width":39,"height":40},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/afghan-sand-inthe-soviet-cogs-may-2-1980/447751.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":42,"@type":43},"Franzy","Person",{"url":19,"name":45,"@type":46},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-10-06","2026-09-29",true,{"@type":52,"interactionType":53,"userInteractionCount":33},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":54},"ViewAction",{"@type":56,"mainEntity":57},"FAQPage",[58,64,68],{"name":59,"@type":60,"acceptedAnswer":61},"What does the speaker identify as the essence of Soviet failure in Afghanistan?","Question",{"text":62,"@type":63},"The speaker argues that Soviet troops, tanks, and helicopters are the essence of failure because secure strategic control of Afghan territory remains beyond reach.","Answer",{"name":65,"@type":60,"acceptedAnswer":66},"How does the document describe the evolution of Soviet strategy in Afghanistan?",{"text":67,"@type":63},"It traces an initial economic approach (1953-1963), followed by political penetration (1964-1979), and then a military occupation phase starting after Christmas of the prior year.",{"name":69,"@type":60,"acceptedAnswer":70},"What costs does the document list as outcomes of Soviet actions?",{"text":71,"@type":63},"Costs include Third World condemnation, intensified U.S. reaction after post-Vietnam isolationism, and psychological and international-recognition pressure reflected in the Olympic boycott 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U.S.Foreign ServiceOfficer,free lance writer.  \nMajor General  \nRICHARDV.SECORD,USAF  \nWith Soviet troops bivouacked in everylarge Afghan town,with Soviet armorpatrolling the Afghan highways,withSoviet helicopter gunships dominatingAfghan airspace,it may sound a bitstrange to term all of this a Soviet failure.Yet,in my view,those very troops andtanks and helicopters are the essence offailure.What the U.S.S.R.first tried to buy,then to obtain by ever more blatant politi-cal pressure,and finally to conquer byforce of arms,still remains beyond itsreach:secure,strategic control of Afghanterritory,available for the onward exten-sion of Soviet influence into the MiddleEast.  \nDirector,International Programs,U.S.Air Force  \n## \"U.S.Military Assistanceto Africa and theMiddle East”\n\nThe Honorable  \nEDMUND G.BROWN,JR.  \nNoon,Ralston RoomSheraton-Palace HotelTickets-$8 at the door.  \nI personally do not believe that theU.S.S.R.will ever achieve that goal,andeven if it does,the immense costs will pro-bably prove to be far heavier than theresult justified.  \nAs director of international operationsfor the Air Force,General Secord coordi-nates military assistance and arms salesworldwide.Coupled with his previous ex-perience in Iran as chief of the U.S.AirForce Military Assistance and AdvisoryGroup in Iran in the late 1970s,he offersan excellent perspective on the posturethe U.S.should take regarding military aidand salesincluding weapons.  \nGovernor of CaliforniaAdvance Ticket Sale LuncheonNoon,TucsdayGrand BallroomFairmont HotelAdvance Tickets-$14  \n## Soviet Costs\n\nThe costs are:Third World condemna-tion,reflected in the 104-18 U.N.GeneralAssembly vote against the U.S.S.R.;anaroused United States,dragged out of itspost-Vietnam neo-isolationism and ofSoviet expansionist designs;and thegathering wave of the Olympic boycottmovement,a stab to that most vulnerableof Soviet psychological Achilles'heel,their desperate need for internationalrecognition and approval.  \nMail check or money order,withself-addressed stamped envelope toCommonwealth Club,681 MarketSt.,S.F.94105,or call 362-4903 forreservations.Tickets must bepurchased by Friday.May 16 at  \nArmed Forces Day Parade—The SanFrancisco Chamber of Commerce willsponsor an Armed Forces Day Parade,beginning at 11:30 a.m.at the Hyatt Regen-cy Hotel,down California Street toMontgomery,and down Montgomery tothe Sheraton-Palace Hotel.  \n9:00 a.m.No refunds after that date.  \nThe future holds still more costs:Sovietpoular discontent;the as yet incalculableeffect which the Afghan resistance willhave on the Soviet Central Asian peoples  \nCAROL E.WILDER  \nCAROL E.WILDER  \nQuarterly Chairman  \nQuarterly Chairman  \nINSIDE:91.Jarvis-Berman Debate on Proposition 9.  \n93.Meeting of South Bay Forum,May 23.  \nNOTE:  Confidential ballots on state propositions mustbe in Club office by 9:00 A.M.May 20,in order to beprocessed.  \nwho ar much closer to the Afghans inrace,culture,and language than they areto the Slavs who rule from Moscow;andthe potential domino effect which continu-ing Afghan resistance will have amongother Soviet minorities,like the Balts andTranscaucasian peoples,and the restiveEastern Europeans  \n## Moscow's Leverage\n\nMoscow's first approach was economic,and it lasted from 1953 to 1963.This wasfollowed by a political penetration phasethat went on for the next fifteen years(1964-79),and which took ever more ob-vious forms.We are now,since Christmasof last year,in the military occupationphase whose duration no one can predict.  \nThe year of 1953,was a pivotal year fora number of reasons.With the close of theKorean War,the United States was lookingmore inward,and Stalin's death allowedSoviet policy to break out of its strait-jacket to some degree.Finally,inAfghanistan itself,Mohammed Daoud,afirst cousin to the king,had just come topower as prime ministerHe brought withhim a coterie of ","cbCaihXPyautHFxL","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaihXPyautHFxL","pdf",3047308,"English","# \"U.S. Military Assistanceto Africa and the Middle East\"\n## Soviet Costs\n## Moscow's Leverage\n## Formal Agreement\n## A Political Revival","[{\"question\":\"What does the speaker identify as the essence of Soviet failure in Afghanistan?\",\"answer\":\"The speaker argues that Soviet troops, tanks, and helicopters are the essence of failure because secure strategic control of Afghan territory remains beyond reach.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the document describe the evolution of Soviet strategy in Afghanistan?\",\"answer\":\"It traces an initial economic approach (1953-1963), followed by political penetration (1964-1979), and then a military occupation phase starting after Christmas of the prior year.\"},{\"question\":\"What costs does the document list as outcomes of Soviet actions?\",\"answer\":\"Costs include Third World condemnation, intensified U.S. reaction after post-Vietnam isolationism, and psychological and international-recognition pressure reflected in the Olympic boycott wave.\"}]","Afghan Sand InThe Soviet Cogs - May 2, 1980 | PDF",1790722700,18]